Problems with Proposed IP Cryptography
draft-rogaway-ipsec-comments-00
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| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Phillip Rogaway | ||
| Last updated | 1995-06-19 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Several recent Internet Drafts make high-level architectural choices and specify low-level cryptographic mechanisms for Internet Protocol (IP) version 4 (IPv4) and IP version 6 (IPv6) security [A-arch, A-ah-arch, A-esp-arch, MS-ah-mech, MKS-esp-mech]. Here I critique cryptographic aspects of this work.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)